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THE REPRESENTATION OF JUVENILES
BEFORE THE COURT: A LOOK INTO THE
PAST AND THE FUTURE
During the last several decades, the judiciary has become increasingly aware of the
disparity between the treatment of juveniles in the juvenile court system and that of
their adult counterparts in the larger court system. While the Supreme Court has
reduced this disparity by requiring independent legal representation for juveniles at
quasi-criminal proceedings, the question remains whether a juvenile has a constitu-
tional right to independent representation at a noncriminal proceeding. This Note
addresses that issue by discussing thepurposes and goals of thejuvenile court system
and evaluating thejuvenile's due process rights. Following an examination of the
legislative and judicial treatment of the issue in Ohio, California and New York, this
Note recommends that independent representation be allowed in both quasi-criminal
and noncriminalproceedings, with distinctions made as to thejunction of counsel in
each forum. In light of the Supreme Court's recent return to a more traditional,
paternalistic view of juveniles, however, the author concludes that the Court will be
unwilling to include legal representation at a noncriminal proceeding as one of a
juvenile's due process rights.
INTRODUCTION
EVERY STATE of this country has a firmly established juvenile
court system which is designed to handle both noncriminal and
quasi-criminal matters. In noncriminal disputes such as divorce,
custody, abuse, neglect, paternity and termination of parental cus-
tody, the juvenile is not a party to the action, I even though his or
her future may be affected significantly by its outcome. Juveniles
appear before juvenile courts in a quasi-criminal context where
the juvenile is charged with the commission of an act which would
constitute a crime if he or she were an adult.2 In that context, a
juvenile may be declared delinquent or in need of supervision,
taken from the parental home, or made a ward of the state?
Since the beginning of this century, juvenile courts have been
separate and distinct from adult courts in procedure, atmosphere
and attitude. In particular, juvenile courts exhibit a more pater-
nalistic attitude and flexible procedure than their adult counter-
parts. During the 1950's and 1960's, however, the courts
increasingly focused on providing equal protection under the law
1. See notes 50-52 infra and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT (29A Pt. 1) § 712 (McKinney 1975); CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 602 (West 1973).
3. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT (29A Pt. 1) §§ 111-176 and note (McKinney 1975)
(Practice Commentaries).
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to all persons, and the Supreme Court began to use the due pro-
cess clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to require fair
and consistent treatment of individuals.4 A parallel consciousness
also developed that juveniles in the juvenile court system were re-
ceiving unfair treatment in comparison with the new protective
treatment guaranteed to adults in the larger court system.5
Judicial recognition of the disparate treatment afforded to
juveniles culminated in a series of Supreme Court cases in the
1960's and early 1970's which guaranteed certain due process
rights to juveniles. One such right, that of representation of
juveniles by independent counsel, was established by the Supreme
Court in In re Gault.7 Although the Court's ruling marked a sig-
nificant departure from prior practice in the juvenile courts, the
decision applied only to delinquency proceedings where the juve-
nile risked being removed from the parental home. This holding
however, has been used as a springboard for the expansion of a
juvenile's right to independent representation in noncriminal ju-
venile court proceedings.'
The lack of constitutional and Supreme Court guidance re-
garding the precise nature and scope of a juvenile's right to in-
dependent representation has made that right unclear. The form
of such representation,9 the mandatory or discretionary nature of
the right,'0 and the role and power of the independent representa-
tive' never have been determined definitively. Thus, the states
have been left to enact their own legislation to provide for some
form of independent representation for juveniles appearing in
court.12
To identify areas of agreement and dispute between the states
4. D. BESHAROV, JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVOCACY 2 (1974).
5. AMERICAN LAW DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE OF THE LIBRARY
OF CONGRESS, CONSTrrUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 2 (1978) [hereinafter cited as CON-
sTITUTIONAL RIOHTS OF CHILDREN]. See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), in which Mr.
Justice Fortas provided a thorough description of the development of the juvenile court
system.
6. See notes 70-83 infra and accompanying text.
7. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See notes 72-75 infra and accompanying text.
8. See notes 70-85 infra and accompanying text.
9. See notes 87, 101 & 11l infra and accompanying text.
10. See notes 97-104 & 111-31 infra and accompanying text.
11. See notes 105-10 & 164-85 infra and accompanying text.
12. Only constitutional challenges to state juvenile law legislation have reached the
federal courts. See notes 70-83 infra and accompanying text. In general, juvenile law and
the juvenile courts are areas which the states regulate autonomously under their reserved
powers. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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and to suggest a possible resolution to the controversy, this Note
first examines the historical development of the juvenile court sys-
tem.13 This system, born of "the highest motives and most en-
lightened impulses,"' 4 was one in which juveniles were denied the
due process rights guaranteed to an adult in a criminal trial.'5
The Supreme Court responded to this dilemma by establishing
certain due process rights for juveniles,' 6 most notably the right to
independent legal representation at a delinquency proceeding.' 7
This Note next analyzes the states' legislative and judicial re-
sponses to the Supreme Court's rulings, concentrating on Ohio,'I
California,' 9 and New York.2" In particular, the Note focuses on
the provisions in these state statutes for a guardian ad litem21 and
legal counsel22 in quasi-criminal and noncriminal juvenile pro-
ceedings and considers alternative approaches advanced by vari-
ous commentators.23
This Note then recommends that the states use one title for a
juvenile representative and that representation be allowed at both
types of proceedings.24 Furthermore, the Note recommends that
the legal representative's function vary according to the type of
proceeding involved. Specifically, in a quasi-criminal proceeding,
the legal representative should act as an advocate, while in a non-
criminal proceeding, the attorney should serve as a source of in-
formation for the court.25 While arguing that this distinction is
justified,26 the Note concludes that the Supreme Court is unlikely
to extend due process to grant a juvenile's right to independent
legal representation at a noncriminal proceeding.27
13. See notes 28-53 infra and accompanying text.
14. 387 U.S. at 17.
15. See notes 53-69 infra and accompanying text.
16. See notes 70-85 infra and accompanying text.
17. See notes 72-75 infra and accompanying text.
18. See notes 97-101, 106 & 112-16 infra and accompanying text.
19. See notes 102 & 117-25 infra and accompanying text.
20. See notes 103-04, 107, 126-31 & 160-63 infra and accompanying text.
21. See notes 94-110 infra and accompanying text.
22. See notes 111-35 infra and accompanying text.
23. See notes 130-85 infra and accompanying text.
24. See notes 186-202 infra and accompanying text.
25. See note 188 infra and accompanying text.
26. See notes 189-91 infra and accompanying text.
27. See notes 192-202 infra and accompanying text.
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I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE
JUVENILE COURT SYSTEM
Because the legal tradition of the nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries supported the view that children were totally vulner-
able and incapable of forming intelligent judgments concerning
their own well-being, and because children were unfamiliar with
the law, parents were charged with the duty of monitoring the
welfare of their children. 8 This concept of the parents' "constitu-
tional primacy"'29 also meant that the state would not interfere un-
reasonably with the right of parents to determine how best to rear
and educate their children.3" The courts and society placed great
emphasis on the maintenance of the family unit.
If there appeared to be a "compelling justification for interfer-
ence," 31 however, the courts, under the historical doctrine of
parens patriae,3 z would intervene into the family relationship33 to
protect the child from obvious parental neglect, abuse or aban-
donment.34 While equity courts were given the power to remove a
child from parental custody and to appoint a guardian when the
parent clearly had failed to care for the child, "[t]he role of the
state then was supplementary to that of the parents until there
arose evidence of abuse of parental responsibility."35 Thus, de-
spite the existence of the doctrine of parens patriae, the courts
were viewed as a last resort for ensuring the well-being of a
child.36
28. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, supra note 5, at 3-4.




33. The doctrine ofparenspatriae first was used to justify the English King's interven-
tion into the lives of the children of his vassals. The King rationalized his intrusion into the
family unit by claiming to be the protector of these children. The term is now used to
indicate the state's right and duty to protect its young, helpless, and incompetent citizens.
D. BESHAROV, supra note 4, at 2 n.5.
34. Id
35. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, supra note 5, at 4-5.
36. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD (1979) [hereinafter cited as J. GOLDSTEIN], in which the authors state that parents
and children have a right of autonomy or "family integrity" which protects them from state
intrusion for several reasons:
The first is to provide parents with an uninterrupted opportunity to meet the de-
veloping physical and emotional needs of their child so as to establish the familial
bonds critical to every child's healthy growth and development. The second pur-
pose, and the one on which the parental right must ultimately rest, is to safeguard
the continuing maintenance of family ties.
Id at 9-10. Other justifications for minimal state intervention advanced by the authors are
19811
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The traditional reluctance of the state to interfere in family life
and the view of the court as a friendly protector of the child
clashed with the equally traditional treatment of juvenile violators
of the criminal law where a benevolent court and the doctrine of
parens patriae were excluded. 37 Thus, juvenile and adult offend-
ers were tried and punished alike, without regard for the special
status of the youthful offender.38
Shocked by procedures and punishments and the fact that
juveniles could be imprisoned for an extended time with hardened
criminals, the early reformers vowed to change the treatment of
juveniles before the courts. 39 The work of such reformers led to
the establishment of separate juvenile courts designed to combine
the courts' protective attitude toward the juvenile in noncriminal
proceedings with the courts' attitude toward the juvenile accused
of a crime. These newly founded courts viewed the child as essen-
tially good and abandoned the old ideas of criminality and pun-
ishment for juvenile offenders.40 Instead, "[tihe child was to be
'treated' and 'rehabilitated' and the procedures, from apprehen-
sion through institutionalization, were to be 'clinical' rather than
punitive."-4 1
The statutory provisions establishing juvenile court systems re-
flect the courts' newly adopted attitude. The Ohio provision
states, for example, that the purposes of the juvenile court are:
(A) To provide for the care, protection, and mental and phys-
ical development of children....
(B) To protect the public interest in removing the conse-
quences of criminal behavior and the taint of criminality from
children committing delinquent acts and to substitute therefor a
program of supervision, care, and rehabilitation;
(C) To achieve the foregoing purposes, whenever possible, in
the court's inability to "supervise the fragile, complex interpersonal bonds between child
and parent," and the child's ability to "respond to the rulings of an impersonal court or
social services agencies as he responds to the demands of personal parental figures." Id at
11-12.
37. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 16.
38. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REv. 104, 106 (1909).
39. Id at 106-07. Because the early treatment ofjuvenile offenders was so similar to
that of adult criminals, "[t]he result of it all was that instead of the states' training its bad
boys so to make of them decent citizens, it permitted them to become the outlaws and
outcasts of society; it criminalized them by the very means that it used in dealing with
them." Id at 107. The "thinking public" shifted from this approach to one in which the
child is taken in hand by the state, "not so much to punish as to reform, not to degrade but
to uplift, not to crush but to develop, not to make him a criminal but a worthy citizen." Id
40. Id
41. 387 U.S. at 15-16. See generally Mack, supra note 38.
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a family environment, separating the child from its parents
only when necessary for his welfare or in the interests of public
safety.
42
A similar provision in the California Code states:
The purpose of this chapter is to secure for each minor
under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court such care and gui-
dance, preferably in his own home, as will serve the spiritual,
emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the
best interests of the state; to protect the public from criminal
conduct by minors; to impose on the minor a sense of responsi-
bility for his own acts; to preserve and strengthen the minor's
family ties whenever possible, removing him from the custody
of his parents only when necessary for his welfare or for the
safety and protection of the public; and, when the minor is re-
moved from his own family, to secure for him custody, care,
and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which
should have been given him by his parents.43
Both sections stress the importance of maintaining the family unit
unless it is absolutely necessary to remove the juvenile from his or
her home. The sections also emphasize the court's role as a be-
nevolent body rather than a coldly objective and punitive one.
The impact of the early reformers on today's juvenile court
system is seen not only in statutory language but also in practice.
A1 juvenile court proceedings, including delinquency proceed-
ings, 4 are considered "civil," and the juvenile never is perceived
as a wrongdoer.45 Differences in treatment between juvenile and
adult offenders appear in the segregation of juveniles from adults
during the adjudication process, in detention and correction facili-
ties, and in the differences in substantive and procedural rules of
court.46
If the juvenile commits a criminal act, the juvenile court has
42. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.01 (Page 1976).
43. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202 (West Supp. 1980).
44. The first step in a juvenile court proceeding is adjudicative and may be either
formal or informal. The court determines whether the juvenile is neglected, abused, de-
pendent, or delinquent as alleged. The second step is dispositional, and the court decides
what, if any, state action is necessary. D. BESHAROV, supra note 4, at 12-14.
45. 387 U.S. at 15-17. See Mack, supra note 38, at 109-10; text accompanying note
42, supra.
46. Most state statutes provide for the establishment of special and separate juvenile
courts, juvenile court procedures, and juvenile detention facilities. See, e.g., OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2151 (Page 1976). Although many procedural safeguards have not been
granted to juveniles, "[t]he protective philosophy has endured, and the juvenile court con-
tinues to perform its function of tailoring justice to meet the needs of the child as those
needs are determined." S. DAVIS, RIGrHTs OF JUVENILES: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
5 (1974). See generally D. BE HAROV, supra note 4.
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great discretion as to the disposition of the case. The judge may
release the juvenile to parental custody, place the juvenile on pro-
bation, send the juvenile to a juvenile facility (reformatory) or rec-
ommend psychological therapy.47 In contrast, sentencing of a
guilty adult defendant is outlined by state criminal law,48 and var-
iations from the prescribed punishment depend largely upon the
language of the relevant statute. A judge, for example, may be
authorized to sentence a defendant for a term between the mini-
mum and maximum limits, set a fine between those limits or in-
crease the punishment for a habitual offender.49
The dissimilarity between adult and juvenile proceedings is
even more pronounced in noncriminal matters. In divorce cus-
tody, adoption, neglect and abuse proceedings, the juvenile is the
subject of, but not a party to, the proceedings.5 0 Although the de-
cision of the juvenile court usually seriously impacted on the juve-
nile's life, the juvenile traditionally was not given the independent
right to "argue his or her case." Rather, in abuse, neglect and
termination of parental custody proceedings, a governmental or
private social agency purported to represent the interests of the
juvenile.5  In these and other noncriminal juvenile proceedings, it
was assumed that a decision by the court based on school, psychi-
atric or agency reports and the testimony of parents and social
workers would reflect sufficiently the best interests of the juve-
nile.52 An interview with the juvenile to determine his or her own
views was preferred, but the court's decision was not conditioned
47. See D. BESHAROV, supra note 4, at 374-92. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2151.354 (Page 1976) (dispositions allowed for an unruly child); id § 2151.355 (disposi-
tions allowed for a delinquent child); id § 2151.353 (dispositions allowed for a neglected or
dependent child); id § 2151.356 (dispositions allowed for juvenile traffic offenders).
48. H. KERPER, INTRODUCTION TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 327 (1972).
49. Id at 327-29.
50. In the introduction to the Divorce Reform Act, an act proposed by the Harvard
Student Legislative Research Bureau, the authors state that "[t]here is much authority for
the proposition that a child is not a proper party in a proceeding for modification of a
custody decree." Project,4 Divorce ReformAct, 5 HARV. J. LEGIs. 563, 577 (1968). But see
OHIO R. Civ. P. 75(B)(2), which allows the court to join the child of parties to a divorce
proceeding when it is necessary to protect that child's interest.
With regard to child abuse and neglect cases, "[the child is neither the plaintiff nor the
respondent. In most states the local department of social services is the plaintiff on behalf
of the child, and the adult who inflicted the injury is the defendant." Fraser, Independent
Representationfor the Abused and Neglected Child- The Guardian Ad Litem, 13 CAL. W.L.
REV. 16, 28 (1976).
51. See D. BESHAROV, supra note 4, at 146-49, 161-62. See also J. GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 36, at 117; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (Page 1976).
52. With regard to divorce proceedings, see Project, supra note 50, at 577.
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on such an interview.53
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE JUVENILE'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
As early as 1948, the Supreme Court held that the due process
rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment5 4 were applicable
to juveniles. In Haley v. Ohio," the Court prohibited the use of a
coerced confession against a juvenile offender in a state criminal
trial.56 No major Supreme Court cases establishing due process
rights for juveniles before the courts, however, were heard for an-
other twenty years.
During these two decades, many juvenile courts denied basic
due process rights to the juvenile in the name of benevolence. In
State v. Shardell,5 ' a juvenile who allegedly had conspired with
two others to commit a burglary was adjudged delinquent. 8 Dur-
ing the juvenile court delinquency proceeding, the presiding judge
compelled Shardell to testify against himself. The judge also ad-
mitted hearsay evidence and required no proof of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.5 9
'Shardell's attorney appealed the coiart's delinquency ruling,
arguing that his client's constitutional rights had been violated.
Since the juvenile was not labeled a "criminal," and the court's
duty was to "take [the child] in hand for the purpose of protecting
him from evil influences," 60 the Ohio Court of Appeals concluded
that only an informal hearing was required.6t According to the
court, the informality and greater flexibility of the juvenile court
were "obviously designed to do away with the usual and custom-
ary ceremony and procedure of court trial in order to surround the
53. D. BESHAROV, supra note 4, at 392-95.
54. The fourteenth amendment of the Constitution states in pertinent part:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
55. 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
56. Id at 599. In Haley, police questioned a 15 year old boy who was accused of
murder from midnight until five a.m. on the morning of his arrest without allowing him to
obtain counsel. In addition, evidence showed that the juvenile was beaten by police during
the questioning. The juvenile signed a written confession after the questioning. Id at 598.
57. 107 Ohio App. 338, 153 N.E.2d 510 (1958).
58. Id at 338, 153 N.E.2d at 511.
59. 107 Ohio App. at 349, 153 N.E.2d at 518. Proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt is required in adult criminal trials. 30 AM. JUR. 2d Evidence § 1170 (1967).
60. 107 Ohio App. at 340, 153 N.E.2d at 512.
61. Id at 340, 153 N.E.2d at 512.
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child with an atmosphere of friendliness and good will rather than
one of hostility and fault-finding."62 On this basis, the court also
concluded that proof by a preponderance of the evidence in a
quasi-criminal juvenile court proceeding did not violate the con-
stitutional rights of the juvenile. 63
In another Ohio case, Cope v. Campbell,' the court declared a
juvenile to be delinquent based on a charge of malicious entry.65
Because of his prior delinquency record, the juvenile was sent to
the state reformatory.66 When the lack of counsel during all of the
proceedings was challenged as violative of the juvenile's rights,67
the court reasoned that because the juvenile was neither prose-
cuted for a criminal offense nor "indicted," "convicted," or "sen-
tenced,''68 there was no need to grant the juvenile the right to
counsel.6 9 The court apparently saw no similarity between the in-
carceration of a juvenile in a state juvenile reformatory and the
confinement of a criminal in prison, although a juvenile could be
confined for a substantial length of time.
In 1966, the Supreme Court began a reversal of the apparent
trend toward unequal due process rights for juveniles and adults.
In Kent v. United States,70 the Court emphasized that "basic re-
quirements of due process" must be satisfied in proceedings to de-
termine whether a juvenile should be tried in an adult criminal
court.7' A year later, the Court announced its landmark decision,
In re Gault.72 In Gault, the Arizona court adjudged the juvenile
defendant delinquent allegedly for making obscene phone calls.7
The juvenile and his parents appealed this ruling, claiming that
62. Id at 340-41, 153 N.E.2d at 512.
63. IM at 341, 344, 153 N.E.2d at 513, 514. But see In re Alger, 19 Ohio St. 2d 70, 84
249 N.E.2d 808, 816 (1969), in which the Supreme Court of Ohio held that a juvenile court
finding of delinquency could be reversed for failure to meet the burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.
64. 175 Ohio St. 475, 196 N.E.2d 457 (1964). In In re Alger, 19 Ohio St. 2d 70,76, 249
N.E.2d 808, 812 (1969), the Supreme Court of Ohio overruled that part of Cope which held
that the presence of counsel in delinquency proceedings is not required constitutionally.
65. Id at 476, 196 N.E.2d at 458.
66. Id, 196 N.E.2d at 458.
67. It also was alleged that deprivation of a jury trial in juvenile proceedings was a
violation of the juvenile's due process rights under the sixth and fourteenth amendments.
Id at 477, 196 N.E.2d at 458.
68. Id, 196 N.E.2d at 458.
69. Id at 478, 196 N.E.2d at 459.
70. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
71. Id at 553.
72. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
73. Id at 8-9.
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the Juvenile Code of Arizona was invalid on its face, or as applied
in their case, because "contrary to the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the juvenile is taken from the custody of
his parents and committed to a state institution pursuant to pro-
ceedings in which the Juvenile Court has virtually unlimited dis-
cretion, and in which the [right to counsel is] denied."7 4 In
response to this challenge, the Supreme Court narrowly held that
a juvenile has a right to independent representation by counsel
but only in a delinquency proceeding where the juvenile may lose
his or her freedom."
Shortly after its decision in Gault, the Supreme Court ex-
tended the protection of another constitutional right to juveniles.
In In re Winship,76 a juvenile who allegedly had committed lar-
ceny faced a possible six-year confinement in a juvenile facility.7
Focusing on the potential loss of liberty and the stigma of convic-
tion,78 the Court held that a juvenile can be convicted of a crime
only upon proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.79 The major-
ity also observed that this standard of proof would not affect ad-
versely the beneficial aspects of juvenile proceedings. °
The Court, however, has not fully incorporated all of the rights
74. Id at 10. The parents charged that other rights also were denied, including the
right to receive notice of charges, the right of confrontation and cross-examination, the
privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a transcript of the proceedings, and the
right to appellate review. Id
75. Id at 41. The Court also ruled that a juvenile has a right to notice of the charges
against him or her, a right to confrontation and cross-examination, and a privilege against
self-incrimination. Id at 1-3. Cf. In re William F., 11 Cal. 3d 249,520 P.2d 986, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 170 (1974) in which counsel for a juvenile had requested permission of the juvenile
court judge to make a closing argument for his young client who had been charged with
obstructing a police officer in the performance of his duties. Id at 251, 520 P.2d at 987, 113
Cal. Rptr. at 171. In refusing the request, the judge stated:
My conclusions are the only ones that are relevant for the record, counsel.
Your conclusions, your opinions to have to express on the evidence could in no
way support a decision one way or the other any more than my observations
do.... This has been a relatively short case, not as short as it might have been
but it has had very limited issues of fact and I don't believe it would be of benefit
to me to have your argument. . . . You have your record, and as I say, nothing
you might say is essential to or even will benefit the record if you choose to carry
it further.
Id at 253 n.3, 520 P.2d at 988 n.3, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 172 n.3 (quoting the juvenile court
transcript). The California Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the juvenile court judge
on appeal.
76. 397 U.S. 358 (1969).
77. Id at 360.
78. Id at 363.
79. Id at 368.
80. Id at 366. Such benefits include the more benevolent attitude of the court toward
the juvenile, the attitude that the court is to rehabilitate rather than punish the juvenile,
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guaranteed to adult offenders into the juvenile court system. In
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,"' the Court held that the due process
standard for juvenile proceedings is "fundamental fairness. ' 82 In
so holding, the Court determined that there is no right to a trial by
jury in juvenile court.83  Hence, the Supreme Court established
two important limits to the grant of due process rights to juveniles:
the extension of the rights of adult offenders to juvenile proceed-
ings only when necessary to achieve fundamental fairness84 and
the guarantee of these rights only in quasi-criminal delinquency
proceedings.85
III. IMPACT OF THE SUPREME COURT CASES: PROVIDING
INDEPENDENT REPRESENTATION FOR JUVENILES
The Supreme Court cases of the 1960's and early 1970's
prompted state legislatures across the country to provide for repre-
sentation of juveniles in their state court systems.86 For centuries,
the guardian ad litem had served as the court-appointed protector
and representative of an incompetent or juvenile party to litiga-
tion.87 Many legislatures retained the traditional guardian ad
litem as one such representative for juveniles88 and other states
enacted new provisions for legal counsel to represent juveniles.
and the greater flexibility in finding solutions to the juvenile's problems. See text accompa-
nying notes 41-43 supra.
81. 403 U.S. 528 (1970).
82. Id at 543. The traditional "fundamental fairness" test determines which constitu-
tional rights must exist at the state level. More specifically, the test guarantees the exercise
of those rights which are so strongly rooted in the conscience and culture of the American
people as to be essential to a scheme of ordered liberty. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325 (1937). As used in this series ofjuvenile court cases, however, "fundamental fairness"
is slightly different. The question in juvenile court cases is whether the court's procedure
"[assumes] procedural regularity sufficient in the particular circumstances to satisfy the
basic requirements of due process and fairness, as well as compliance with the statutory
requirement of a 'full investigation'." Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966).
83. Id at 545. In holding that a right to a jury trial is not guaranteed in juvenile
hearings, Justice Blackmun stressed that a jury trial is not essential to accurate factfnding
and that it may, in fact, be detrimental to the juvenile process in making it too much like a
full adversary procedure. Justice Blackmun also observed that "[ilf the formalities of the
criminal adjudicative process are to be superimposed upon the juvenile court system, there
is little need for its separate existence." 403 U.S. at 551.
84. The test of "fundamental fairness," as described in McKeiver, emphasizes the
need to provide fair and unbiased factfinding in juvenile proceedings. The rights granted
in Gault, Kent, and Winshoa ensure that a juvenile will have a fair chance to establish that
he or she is not a delinquent, and thus are consistent with the McKeiver standard.
85. See notes 72-75 supra and accompanying text.
86. J. MCDONOUGH, D. KING & J. GARRETT, JUVENILE COURT HANDBOOK 2 (1970).
87. BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 540 (3d ed. 1969).
88. See notes 94-102 infra and accompanying text.
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In examining the various state code provisions for juvenile
representation, however, several significant problems become ap-
parent. In some states, the provisions are not codified in a single
chapter of the code. In California, for example, such provisions
can be found in the Civil Code, 9 the Probate Code,90 and the
Welfare and Institutions Code.91 It is difficult, therefore, for an
attorney to determine whether a juvenile should be represented.
Furthermore, the codes often do not dictate whether a guardian
ad litem or an attorney should represent the juvenile or whether
such representation is mandatory or discretionary.92 The Practice
Commentaries, which accompany the New York code provisions
for "Law Guardians" in juvenile proceedings, identify a signifi-
cant cause of this ambiguity:
Although a major reason for the creation of the Law Guardian
system was to meet the need for the legal representation of chil-
dren before the Family Court, lingering behind its creation was
the hope that law guardians would not create a fully adver-
sarial system in the Family Court. Hence their title: "Law
Guardian," which sought to marry the dual concerns of due
process and the child's best interest.93
The provisions of the Ohio, California, and New York codes ex-
amined below not only represent the wide variance in the clarity
and thoroughness of such statutory provisions, but also indicate
the spectrum of state responses to the juvenile's needs.
A. Provisionsfor Representation by a Guardian Ad Litem
The guardian ad litem, chosen by the juvenile's family, a social
agency, or the court, is a temporary guardian with limited powers
before the court.94 In general, the guardian ad litem is charged
with the duty to represent the "best interests" of the juvenile.9 To
execute this duty, a guardian ad litem may be required to institute
or defend a civil suit. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vide for these contingencies:
89. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 372 (West 1973).
90. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1607 (West 1973).
91. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 634 (West 1973).
92. See notes 97-104 infra and accompanying text
93. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT (29A Pt. 1) § 241 note (McKinney 1975) (Practice Com-
mentaries).
94. Fraser, supra note 50, at 29. A guardian ad litem serves only from the time of his
or her appointment until the termination of the proceedings and may not have the full
powers of an attorney before the court if he or she is not an attorney. But cf. OHIO R. Juv.
P. 4(C) which allows a guardian ad litem who is an attorney to act as such for the juvenile.
95. J. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 36, at 16.
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If an infant or incompetent person does not have a duly ap-
pointed representative he may sue by his next friend or by a
guardian ad litem. The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem
for an infant or incompetent person not otherwise represented
in an action or shall make such other order as it deems proper
for the protection of the infant or incompetent person.9 F
The Ohio provisions for representation in noncriminal juve-
nile proceedings demonstrate a more specific role for the guardian
ad litem, that is, protecting.the interests of a child in any proceed-
ing involving the alleged abuse or neglect of that child.97 The
Ohio Juvenile Court Rules add that a guardian ad litem will be
appointed when the juvenile has no parent or other legal guard-
ian,98 when the court finds a conflict of interest between the juve-
nile and his or her parent or legal guardian,99 or when the
"[a]ppointment is otherwise necessary to meet the requirements of
a fair hearing."' l In quasi-criminal juvenile proceedings, Ohio
law also requires the appointment of a guardian ad litem when the
juvenile has no parent or other legal guardian or when there is an
apparent conflict of interest between the juvenile and his or her
parent or guardian. 101
In California, provisions for a guardian ad litem in noncrimi-
nal proceedings are not particular to the juvenile code but are
found in the Civil and Civil Procedure Codes as well.'02 There
are also no special provisions in California which authorize a
guardian ad litem to represent the juvenile in a quasi-criminal
proceeding. In contrast, the New York statutes provide for the
services of a "Law Guardian" for juveniles who cannot or do not
select their own counsel. According to one New York court, the
96. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(c).
Congress has expanded the role of the guardian ad litem to include the representation
of every juvenile involved in a neglect or abuse case which results in judicial proceedings
by tying such representation to the ability of a state to receive aid under the Federal Child
Abuse, Prevention, and Treatment Act § 4(b)(2)(G), 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(2)(G) (1976).
97. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.281 (Page 1976).
98. OHIo R. Juv. P. 4(B).
99. Id In Barth v. Barth, 12 Ohio Misc. 141, 225 N.E.2d 866 (C.P. 1967), the court
held that a guardian ad litem was required to protect the child's interests in a divorce
action where those interests "are, or may be, substantially different from either or both of
the parties." Id at 141, 225 N.E.2d at 867.
100. OHIo R. Juv. P. 4(B).
101. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.281(A)-(B) (Page 1976).
102. CAL. CIV. CODE § 42 (West 1973) states in part that "[a] minor may enforce his
rights by civil action, or other legal proceedings, in the same manner as a person of full age,
except that a guardian must conduct the same." CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 372 (West 1973)
states that a guardian ad litem must appear and represent any juvenile, insane, or incompe-
tent person who is a party to a civil action.
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Law Guardian in noncriminal juvenile proceedings has "precisely
the same functions of a guardian ad litem appointed to represent
an infant in a civil action:"103 to protect the child's best interests
and to express the juvenile's views to the court. 14
While it appears that a guardian ad litem often is directed to
act in a child's "best interests," there is no consensus among courts
or legal scholars as to the meaning of that term. 10 5 The Ohio
Code, for example, states simply that a guardian ad litem is to
"protect the interest of the child""w without specifying whether
that phrase means that the guardian ad litem is expected to pres-
ent the juvenile's views or the guardian's own conclusions to the
court. The New York Code is slightly more specific, stating that a
Law Guardian is to protect the interests of juveniles and help ex-
press their views to the court.10 7 These brief descriptions of the
representative's function are unsatisfactory because neither
description fully defines the extent of the representative's powers
or states whether those powers are more or less limited than the
powers of an attorney in an adult court. Moreover, the absence of
a provision specifying qualifications for service as a guardian ad
litem may result in the representation of juveniles by inexperi-
enced, untrained persons unable to serve the juvenile
effectively.108
The duties of the guardian ad litem have been outlined with
relative consistency, however, in law review commentary. Gener-
ally, the role of the guardian ad litem is three-faceted: he or she is
to protect the fundamental rights of the juvenile, advance the ju-
venile's "best interests," and assist the court in formulating its de-
103. Matter of Anonymous v. Anonymous, 70 Misc. 2d 584, 585, 333 N.Y.S.2d 897, 899
(Far. Ct. 1972).
104. Id at 585, 333 N.Y.S.2d at 899 (citing N.Y. FAm. CT. ACT (29A PL I) § 241 (Mc-
Kinney 1975)).
105. J. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 36, at 16. See also Solender, The Guardan AdLiten" .4
Valuable Representative or an Illusory Safeguard?, 7 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 619, 638-39
(1976).
106. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.281 (Page 1976).
107. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 241 (McKinney 1975).
108. Solender, supra note 105, at 642-43. But see N.Y. FAM. CT. ACr (29A Pt. ) § 242
(McKinney 1975); OHIO R. Juv. P. 4(C). The former requires the representative to be a
practicing attorney and the latter recognizes that a guardian ad litem who is an attorney
may serve as legal counsel to the juvenile. Furthermore, the Cleveland Federation for
Community Planning has a structured program and printed manual for the training of
guardians ad litem which at least attempts to familiarize the participants with their role in
the Ohio juvenile court system. FEDERATION FOR COMMUNTrrY PLANNING, CUYAHOGA
COUNTY JUVENILE COURT, OHIO, GUARDLANS AD LITEM FOR CHILDREN PROJECT ORIEN-
TATION MANUAL (undated).
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cision. 109 More specifically, the guardian ad litem is an in-
vestigator of facts, an advocate to bring those facts to the attention
of the court, a counsel to present all possible options to the court,
and a guardian to protect the juvenile's interests and to ensure
that the orders of the court are fulfilled. "10 Unless the guardian ad
litem, however, is apprised of these duties and allowed to exercise
these powers, his or her value to the juvenile and the court is di-
minished greatly.
B. Representation by Legal Counsel
A juvenile's right to independent legal counsel when his or her
freedom is at stake in a delinquency proceeding is established
firmly."I' Most states also, either expressly or impliedly, grant a
right to legal counsel in many noncriminal proceedings. The Ohio
Code, for example, provides that a juvenile is entitled to represen-
tation at all stages of the "proceedings" and that such representa-
tion "must be provided for a child not represented by his parent,
guardian, or custodian."" 2 The Ohio Rules of Juvenile Procedure
further stipulate that every "party" to a juvenile court proceeding
has a right to representation by legal counsel" 3 and defines
"party" to include a child who is the subject of any such proceed-
ing. "14 Thus, it appears that the scope of "proceedings" at which
109. Note, Protecting the Interests of Children in Custody Proceedings.- A Perspective on
Twenty Years of Theory and Practice in the Appointment of Guardians Ad Litem, 12
CREIGHTON L. REV. 234 (1978).
110. See generally Fraser, supra note 50, at 45; Kargman, A Court Appointed ChildAd-
vocate (Guardian Ad Litem) Reports on Her Role in Contested Child Custody Cases and
Looks to the Future, 3 J. DIVORCE 77 (1979). See also FEDERATION FOR COMMUNITY
PLANNING, supra note 108.
111. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), established this right for juveniles charged with
criminal conduct. See notes 72-75 supra and accompanying text.
112. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.352 (Page 1976) provides in part:
A child... is entitled to representation by legal counsel at all stages of the pro-
ceedings and if, as an indigent person, he is unable to employ counsel, to have
counsel provided for him .... Counsel must be provided for a child not repre-
sented by his parent, guardian, or custodian. If the interests of two or more such
parties conflict, separate counsel shall be provided for each of them.
113. OHIO R. Juv. P. 4(A) states:
Every party shall have the right to be represented by counsel and every child...
the right to appointed counsel if indigent. These rights shall arise when a person
becomes a party to a juvenile court proceeding. When the complaint alleges that
a child is an abused child, the court must appoint an attorney to represent the
interests of the child.
114. Id R. 2(16). It is crucial to note, however, that Ohio's Rules of Juvenile Proce-
dure specifically state that the rules shall not apply to appeals, criminal trials, and divorce,
annulment, alimony, and paternity actions. Id R. l(C).
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the juvenile is entitled to be represented by legal counsel is very
broad.
The Ohio rules of court also support the juvenile's right to
counsel in certain noncriminal proceedings. The Ohio Rules of
Civil Procedure authorize the appointment of legal counsel in di-
vorce, annulment and alimony actions if the juvenile is joined as a
party and if the appointment is essential to the protection of the
juvenile's interests.' 15 In abuse cases, the Ohio Rules of Juvenile
Procedure require the court to "appoint an attorney to represent
the interests of the child."'' 1 6
The California Code contains a more thorough and detailed
provision for counsel in noncriminal proceedings. A juvenile may
be represented by independent counsel in proceedings to declare
the juvenile's home unfit,1 '7 to determine the temporary custody
of a dependent child,"' to free a minor from parental custody, 119
and to determine custody in divorce actions.'20 Several cases add
a significant gloss to these provisions. In In re Dunlap, 2' a Cali-
fornia appellate court held that while the court has discretionary
power to appoint counsel for juveniles in proceedings to free them
from parental custody, the court must appoint independent coun-
sel unless there is a showing why counsel should not be ap-
pointed.' 2 Similarly, in In re Richard E.,'2 the California
Supreme Court ruled that a court must exercise its discretion to
appoint independent legal counsel where the juvenile's separate
interests are not protected by the parent or the petitioner seeking
to remove the juvenile from parental custody. 24 The court noted,
however, that reversals for failure to appoint independent counsel
for juveniles would occur only where that failure resulted in a
miscarriage of justice."n
115. OHmo R. Cv. P. 75(B)(2).
116. OHIO R. Juv. P. 4(A); see note 96 supra.
117. CAL. WaLF. & INST. CODE § 318 (West Supp. 1980).
118. Id §§ 315-316.
119. CAL. CIw. CODE §§ 237-.5 (West Supp. 1980).
120. Id § 4606.
121. 62 Cal. App. 3d 428, 133 Cal. Rptr. 310 (1976).
122. Id at 439, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 316. The court did not reach the question of when a
failure to appoint counsel would be justified.
123. 21 Cal. 3d 349, 579 P.2d 495, 146 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1978).
124. Id at 354, 579 P.2d at 499, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
125. Id at 355, 579 P.2d at 499, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 608. The dissent argued strongly that
because termination of parental custody is a drastic measure, independent counsel is neces-
sary: "At the minimum, appointed counsel could have interviewed Richard and ascer-
tained his feelings toward his brothers and his father and discussed his future. This
information could have been conveyed to the court. Finally, counsel could have supple-
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Of the three states whose statutes are under consideration,
New York's provisions are the most comprehensive. The New
York Family Court Act" 6 provides for independent legal counsel
in various proceedings, including those proceedings which deter-
mine whether the juvenile is a "person in need of supervision"' 7
or has been abused or neglected.' The reach of this comprehen-
sive statute was extended further in Borkowski v. Borkowski"z9
which suggested that the determination of a child's custody is as
important to the child as it is to the parents. In support of its
determination, the court stated:
[The clear consensus emerges that the child has a legal interest
and specific rights to protect in a custody dispute, that neither
the court nor the parents can adequately represent those inter-
ests, and that the most effective means of protecting the child's
interest in our adversary system is by independent counsel for
the child.'
30
Thus, the court held that juveniles who are subjects in a contested
divorce custody proceeding are entitled to independent legal
representation.'13
Providing a juvenile with independent legal counsel in non-
criminal proceedings is much more controversial than providing
the same services in quasi-criminal proceedings. First, in cases of
parental neglect or abuse, the agency which petitions the court for
removal of the juvenile from an unsafe home purportedly protects
the juvenile. 32 Moreover, in those cases and also in divorce cus-
tody disputes, the juvenile is merely the subject of, but not a party
to, the proceedings and is not a wrongdoer in need of a defense.133
Second, courts and commentators hesitate to advocate the intro-
duction of an adversarial quality to these proceedings because that
mented the sketchy probation report." Id at 361, 579 P.2d at 503, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 612
(Bird, J., dissenting).
126. (29A Pt. 1) §§ 111-121 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1980).
127. Id § 249(a) (McKinney Supp. 1980). A person in need of supervision is defined
as a
male less than sixteen years of age and a female less than eighteen years of age
who does not attend school in accord with. . . law or who is incorrigible, un-
governable or habitually disobedient and beyond the lawful control of parent or
other lawful authority or who violates. . . the penal law.
Id § 712 (McKinney Supp. 1980).
128. Id § 249(a) (McKinney Supp. 1980). See id § 1032 (McKinney 1975).
129. 90 Misc. 2d 957, 396 N.Y.S.2d 962 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
130. Id at 960, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 964. See generally N.Y. FAm. CT. AcT (29A Pt. 1)
§ 249 and note (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1980) (Practice Commentaries).
131. 90 Misc. 2d at 962, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 965.
132. See OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (Page 1976).
133. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
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position would be contrary to the original scheme of the juvenile
court system. 134 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, because
Gault established this right only with respect to quasi-criminal
proceedings,13 there is no constitutional directive for such a right
in noncriminal proceedings.
C. Alternative Approaches to Independent
Representation by Legal Counsel
The debate over the appropriateness of providing juveniles
with independent legal counsel in noncriminal proceedings has
not subsided.136 One group of well-known scholars 137 opposed to
such representation asserts that the law presumes that parents are
capable of determining the legal care needs of their own chil-
dren; 38 when the court intervenes, therefore, one of its primary
considerations must be the maintenance of the family unit.139
These scholars believe that any court appointment of counsel for
the juvenile which fails to consider the parents' views "is a drastic
alteration of the parent-child relationship. . . , intrudes upon the
integrity of the family and strains the psychological bonds" that
hold the family together. 14° Any such appointment would be det-
rimental to the relationship between parent and child.'4 1 These
scholars propose, therefore, that the juvenile court appoint coun-
sel only when the juvenile's parents have been disqualified as the
legal representatives of their child's interests 42 or when the par-
ents request, but cannot afford to obtain, such counsel.1 43 Thus, a
juvenile would be represented by independent counsel only when
his or her parents request or consent to such an appointment or
134. See notes 41-42 supra and accompanying text.
135. See notes 72-75 supra and accompanying text.
136. See notes 132-35 supra and accompanying text.
137. Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit, authors of Beyond the Best In-
terests of the Child (published in 1973) and Before the Best Interests of the Child (published
in 1979), are representative of three different institutions, respectively: the Yale Law
School, the Hampstead Child-Therapy Clinic, London, and the Child Study Center, Yale
University.
138. J. GOLDSTEN, supra note 36, at 112.
139. Id at 5.
140. Id at 112.
141. Id at 125.
142. Such a disqualification may be warranted where the parent is a minor himself, is
declared incompetent due to mental illness or retardation or, in cases of abuse, neglect, or
denial of necessary medical care for a child. Id at 72-90, 95, 109, 143, 194. In such cases,
"the protective insulation that parents give children from the law has been broken by the
establishment at adjudication of a ground for intervention." Id at 112.
143. Id at 111.
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when an emergency results in the temporary removal of the child
from parental control. 1" Moreover, representation would not be
allowed until after the court has determined that there has been
parental neglect, abuse or delinquency; counsel thus would serve
only during the dispositional hearings.1 45
If a juvenile receives independent representation, many fear
that family bonds may weaken as parents are forced to employ an
intermediary, the juvenile's counsel, to accomplish what is best for
their own child. 146 Since the juvenile and the court, however, lack
independent power to obtain separate counsel for the juvenile,
parents effectively could suppress any interest in conflict with their
own by refusing to consent to separate counsel for their child.
This result would be especially troubling in the context of abuse,
neglect, delinquency or a divorce custody proceeding where
strained family relations already may exist. Hence, maintenance
of family bonds is a weak basis on which to disfavor the appoint-
ment of independent legal counsel for a juvenile.
At the opposite end of the spectrum is a second approach
which would make separate legal counsel available to juveniles at
both the adjudicatory and dispositional stages' 47 of noncriminal
and quasi-criminal proceedings.148 This approach extends the
right to independent counsel established in the 1967 Gault deci-
sion 49 by focusing on the dispositional stage of a juvenile pro-
ceeding. Thus, regardless of the characterization of an action as
quasi-criminal or noncriminal, because the proceeding often re-
sults in the juvenile's removal from the parental home and place-
ment in the state's custody, representation is justified. 15 Another
justification for the extension is similarity of purpose: "In both
custody and juvenile proceedings identical goals are pursued: the
protection of society's young and the assurance that they will have
a hopeful future."' 5' 1 Those individuals who support this expan-
sive view conclude that the juvenile's right to independent legal
144. Id at 114-15.
145. Id at 111-12 (emphasis added).
146. Id at 125.
147. Popkin, Lippert & Keiter, Another Look at the Role of Due Process in JuvenileCourt, 6 FAM. L.Q. 233, 243 (1972), reprinted in TGE YOUNGEST MINolIT': LAWYES IN
DEFENSE OF CHILDREN 173, 183 (S. Katz ed. 1974).
148. Inker & Perretta, .4 Child's Right to Counsel in Custody Cases, 5 FAM. L.Q. 108,
115 (1971), reprinted in THE YOUNGEST MINoRrrY, supra note 147 at 32, 39.
149. See notes 72-75 supra and accompanying text.
150. See notes 147-48 supra and accompanying text.
151. Inker & Peretta, supra note 148, at 115, reprinted in THE YOUNGEST MINORrrY,
supra note 147, at 39.
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counsel should not be predicated on the type of legal action in-
volved. These people believe that any distinction between quasi-
criminal and noncriminal proceedings is essentially "contrived,
artificial, and without foundation."1 52
Several commentators have suggested that provisions for legal
representation should be extended to all juveniles involved in di-
vorce custody proceedings. According to one proponent of this
view, parental judgment in this situation is clouded by emotion
and parents are under no obligation to advocate their child's inter-
ests over their own.' 53 For these reasons, separate legal counsel
for children of divorce is considered the only way for the court to
recognize all interests and reach a well-reasoned and appropriate
decision. 54 The Divorce Reform Act,1 55 proposed by the Harvard
Journal of Legislation, requires the selection or appointment of
independent counsel for children involved in divorce custody dis-
putes 156 and grants the children all the powers of any other party
to the action.' 57 The proposed Act stipulates that the attorney is
to "represent the interests of the children as they appear to the
lawyers, taking account of the children's own opinions and other
relevant considerations."'15  To date, state legislatures have been
unwilling to adopt such a radical extension of the rights estab-
lished by the Supreme Court in Gault.159
A more moderate approach is reflected in the New York Fain-
152. Id at 119, reprinted in THE YOUNGEST MINoRrry, supra note 147, at 43.
153. Id
154. Id
155. See Project, supra note 50.
156. Id at 583 § 201(b).
157. Id at 584 § 201(c)(1).
158. Id § 201(c)(2). Section 201(b) of the proposed Act states further
The court shall appoint lawyers for the children named .... At the beginning
of or during the proceedings, the court may appoint a single lawyer for children
whose interests appear to coincide, or separate lawyers for children whose inter-
ests appear to conflict.
Id at 583 § 201(b). The Comment accompanying this section of the Act adds that:
The inability of children to select their own lawyers creates a dilemma. If the
court does not assume the responsibility of appointing lawyers, the children will
not obtain them; but court appointed lawyers may not pursue their clients' inter-
ests as avidly as those selected by the client. The latter problem may be solved in
part by involvement of older children in the selection process, and frequent con-
sultation between the children and their counsel
Id, Comment at 584.
159. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Some courts, however, have extended the right to counsel to
noncriminal juvenile proceedings. The New York Supreme Court in Borkowski v. Bor-
kowski, 90 Misc. 2d 957, 396 N.Y.S.2d 962 (Sup. Ct. 1977), for example, held that where
the parents' views override those of their children in a divorce proceeding, the court can
appoint counsel to represent the children. See notes 129-31 supra and accompanying text.
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ily Court Act and its accompanying practice commentaries. 160
The Act attempts to create a dual responsibility in the juvenile's
Law Guardian: to ensure a reasoned determination of facts and
the proper disposition of the case, similar to that which is required
of a guardian ad litem, and to present the juvenile's own views to
the court, similar to that which is required of an attorney in an
adult court. 16'
Regardless of the reluctance of many legislatures to create a
fully adversarial system in the juvenile courts, amendments to the
New York Family Court Act exemplify a trend toward providing
juveniles with separate legal representation in all juvenile pro-
ceedings.62 Thus, at least in New York, "the adversarial nature
of Family Court proceedings has increased and been accentuated
beyond anything the original drafters of the Family Court Act
probably contemplated."' 63
Adding to the already unsettled issue of independent counsel
for juveniles are the major conflicts which arise concerning the
role and function of such counsel once it is determined that repre-
sentation of the juvenile is warranted. Because juvenile courts are
intended to be nonadversarial, it is unclear whether it is appropri-
ate to have a zealous attorney arguing the juvenile's case and
whether counsel should represent the juvenile's views or argue for
a disposition which counsel determines is in the juvenile's best in-
terests. The resolution of these issues depends partially on the
kind of proceeding in which the juvenile is involved. Arguably,
because counsel in a quasi-criminal proceeding is akin to an adult
defense attorney, he or she should play a more adversarial role
than an attorney for a juvenile in a noncriminal proceeding.
Many believe that attorneys for alleged juvenile delinquents
are expected to defend their young clients to the same extent they
160. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT (29A Pt. 1) §§ 111-1211 and note (McKinney 1975 & Supp.
1980).
161. Id § 241 and note (McKinney 1975).
162. The 1970 amendments to section 241 added provisions for representation by a
Law Guardian in certain noncriminal proceedings. Recent amendments to section 249
have added provisions for the appointment of a Law Guardian when a minor is sought to
be placed in protective custody, Pub. L. No. 1976, ch. 656, § 1, when the guardianship and
custody of destitute or dependent children is determined, Pub. L. No. 1977, ch. 859, § 1,
when a child is declared in need of supervision and is removed from the parental home,
Pub. L. No. 1978, ch. 481, § 46, and when a juvenile's commitment to the commissioner of
mental health or mental retardation is to be continued, Pub. L. No. 1979, ch. 531, § 4
(amending N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT (29A Pt. 1) § 249 (McKinney Supp. 1980)).
163. Id § 241 note (McKinney 1975).
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would defend an adult offender." Like an adult, "[tihe juvenile
needs the assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law, to
make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the
proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a defense and to pre-
pare and submit it."'65 Thus, in describing the nature of the Law
Guardian's role, the Practice Commentaries to the New York
Family CourtAct state:
For all practical purposes, the factfinding hearing in a delin-
quency case is handled [like] the defense of an adult criminal
prosecution. At the outset the attorney should be disabused of
the notion that all juvenile delinquency proceedings involve
children's crimes, such as petty larceny and neighborhood
fights. Attorneys in Juvenile Court are called upon to defend
alleged [murders], rapists ..... No matter how the attorney
may personally feel about a particular child, the crime alleg-
edly committed, or the possible need for incarceration, his duty
is to defend the child with zeal. 166
Similarly, a New York court recently held that a juvenile's consti-
tutional right to counsel in a quasi-criminal proceeding "extends
to the right and duty of such counsel to proceed in the same man-
ner as counsel representing a defendant in a criminal
proceeding."' 67
While counsel in quasi-criminal juvenile proceedings may be
guided as to their function in juvenile court by their knowledge of
how to conduct an adult criminal defense, it is much more difficult
to recognize the role and function of independent counsel in non-
criminal proceedings. This difficulty may exist because few ac-
tions in adult court parallel noncriminal juvenile proceedings. 68
Nevertheless, it generally is agreed that in both quasi-criminal
and noncriminal proceedings, an attorney has at least the same
duties as a guardian ad litem: to investigate and gather facts, to
164. See note 169 infra and accompanying text.
165. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 36.
166. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 241, note (McKinney 1975) (Practice Commentaries) (quot-
ing FAMILY COURT BRANCH, NEW YoRK LEGAL AID SOCIETY, MANUAL FOR NEW AT-
ToRNEYs 10 (undated)).
167. Rapoport v. Berman, 49 A.D.2d 930, 931, 373 N.Y.S.2d 652, 654 (1975). In Rapo-
port, the Law Guardian appealed from an order prohibiting him from interviewing the
petitioner who, in the Law Guardian's opinion, had information relevant to his juvenile
client's case. Although the appeal was dismissed for lack of current controversy, the court
did comment upon the power and function of the Law Guardian. In particular, the court
stated that counsel has the right to interview "any petitioner or witness who may possess
information bearing on the issues before the court." Id at 931, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 654.
168. But see Note, The Role of Counsel in the Civil Commitment Process.- .4 Theoretical
Framework, 84 YALE LJ. 1540, 1544-46 (1975) (suggesting that a civil action to commit a
person to a mental institution is similar to a noncriminal juvenile proceeding).
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interview the juvenile and other interested parties, and to discover
what resolution would be in the juvenile's best interests. 69 Addi-
tionally, legal counsel usually is expected to ascertain the views of
the juvenile.170
Courts and commentators are divided, however, as to what in-
terest counsel for a juvenile should represent in a noncriminal
proceeding. Some suggest that counsel must be bound by the ju-
venile's own determination of his or her best interests.l71 The
New York Surrogate Court adhered to this view stating:
[A] court is required to depend upon the professional ability
and efforts of an attorney whose sole purpose should be to ad-
vocate the cause and rights of the infant; to see that all ques-
tions necessary to be raised are raised, and submitted for
decision by the court. The attorney for the infant must be
strictly an advocate and his efforts should not be left merely to
his charitable instincts .... 72
Others believe that while the preferences or views expressed by
the juvenile must be recognized, counsel must consider other fac-
tors before determining what disposition would be in the "best
interests of the child." 173 Such other factors might include the
opinions of parents or other interested parties and the views of
169. See Davidson, Legal Advocacyfor ChUldren in the Courts: A New Challenge, 36
NLADA BRIEFCASE 112 (1979); Heilman, So You're Going to Represent a Juvenilel, 6 PEP-
PERDINE L. REV. 783 (1979); Mlyniec, The ChildAdvocate in Private Custody Dlsputes: A
Role in Search ofa Standard, 16 J. FAM. L. 1 (1977-78).
170. See, eg., Davidson, supra note 169.
171. See, e.g., id The author also asserts that in cases were the juvenile is unable to
make a considered decision as to his or her own best interests, counsel should either ask the
court to appoint a guardian ad litem to make this determination or argue for the least
intrusive intervention possible. Id at 113-14.
172. In re Guardianship of Mark V., 80 Misc. 2d 986, 988, 365 N.Y.S.2d 463, 465
(1975). Contra, In re Apel 96 Misc. 2d 839, 409 N.Y.S.2d 928 (Fain. Ct. 1978), where an
order to dismiss the court-appointed Law Guardian was sought on the ground that he was
biased in favor of a certain disposition of the case. Although the court denied the request
in this case on other grounds, the court stated:
At the outset of the case, a Law Guardian, who in addition to his role as counsel,
advocate and guardian serves also in a quasi-judicial capacity in that he has some
responsibility, at least during the dispositional phase of the proceeding, to aid the
court in arriving at a proper disposition, should, like the judge, be neutral.
Id at 842-43, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 930. It should be noted, however, that the Practice Com-
mentaries accompanying section 241 of the New York Family Court Act note that this
aspect of the decision is troublesome. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACr § 241 note (McKinney Supp.
1980) (Practice Commentaries). Since the Law Guardian is expected to acquire as much
knowledge of the case as possible before the hearing, it may be unwise and naive not to
expect counsel to form even a preliminary opinion as to the proper outcome of the case.
Id
173. See, eg., Heilman, supra note 169; Mlyniec, supra note 139.
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police, social workers or physicians.'74 Reasoning that the use of
an advocate in-custody disputes will not make judicial decisions in
these cases easier or more accurate, one commentator suggested
that the "best interests of the child" standard be discarded.1 75
This commentator then suggested that custody could be awarded
to the parent who would not endanger the child's health or to the
parent with whom the child has a stronger relationship. 76 Using
either of these standards, the juvenile's attorney would perform
primarily an investigative role, 177 rather than an adversarial one.
Although the role and power of counsel for juveniles remain
ambiguous, certain court decisions have given some indication of
the scope of that power. The Supreme Court's use of the "funda-
mental fairness" test in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania178 has intro-
duced adversarial elements into the juvenile court system.
Particularly in delinquency proceedings, counsel has been granted
much of the power and assumes a role similar to that of counsel in
an adult court. The California Supreme Court held, for example,
that the right to deliver a closing argument in a deliquency pro-
ceeding was an "integral part of the right of a juvenile to be repre-
sented by counsel" and that the juvenile court's failure to allow
the argument offended the test of "fundamental fairness."' 17 9 The
California Supreme Court also requires counsel to submit tran-
scripts of arguments advanced on behalf of the juvenile so that the
presiding judge is apprised fully of the juvenile's defense posture
before deciding the case.' 80
Recently, in James H. v. Superior Court,'8 ' a California appel-
late court ruled that juvenile court proceedings must be suspended
until the court determines that the juvenile is competent to coop-
erate with his or her counsel, since there is no value in providing
counsel unless it is effective counsel.'82 Several New York courts
174. See, eg., Heilman, supra note 169, at 791; Mlyniec, supra note 169, at 16.
175. Mlyniec, supra note 169, at 13.
176. Id
177. Id at 13-15.
178. 403 U.S. 528 (1970). See notes 81-83 supra and accompanying text.
179. In re William F., 11 Cal. 3d 249, 255, 520 P.2d 986, 989, 113 Cal. Rptr. 170, 173
(1974). The juvenile in this case was charged with obstructing a police officer in the per-
formance of his duty. The court order, which placed the juvenile on a six-month proba-
tion, was overruled because of the court's disallowance of counsel's request to make a
closing argument for the juvenile. Id at 257, 520 P.2d at 990, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 174.
180. In re Damon C., 16 Cal. 3d 493, 497, 546 P.2d 676, 679, 128 Cal. Rptr. 172, 175
(1976).
181. 77 Cal. App. 3d 169, 143 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1978).
182. Id at 174, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 400.
1981]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
have held similarly, emphasizing that the juvenile must be pro-
vided with well-prepared counsel' 8 3 throughout the proceed-




The prevalent statutory separation of provisions for juvenile
representation by a guardian ad litem and legal counsel'8 6 appears
to be a source of confusion and an often meaningless distinction.
Perhaps state legislatures could clarify their provisions by giving
one title to any representative of a juvenile, as the New York legis-
lature has done by providing for independent juvenile representa-
tion by a Law Guardian."8 7 Allowing such a representative in all
juvenile proceedings, both noncriminal and quasi-criminal, would
eliminate further confusion. A distinction then could be made as
to the function of the representative in different types of proceed-
ings. In a quasi-criminal proceeding, the juvenile's representative
would be obligated to protect the juvenile's interests by defending
the juvenile against all charges. In a noncriminal proceeding, on
the other hand, the representative's function would be to present
all relevant facts to the court to ensure its awareness of the juve-
nile's unique status.' 88
This expansion of the limited right to legal counsel established
in Gault is justified. Juveniles involved in noncriminal proceed-
ings also have legitimate concerns which often are unrecognized
and rights which need the protection of knowledgeable counsel,
particularly because the juvenile court has the power to make ma-
jor decisions affecting the juvenile's future.'89 For these reasons,
the juvenile's right to legal counsel is as fundamental in noncrimi-
nal proceedings as it is in quasi-criminal proceedings. If the juve-
183. See, e.g., In re Gary T., 29 A.D.2d 980, 289 N.Y.S.2d 790 (1968), where a new trial
was ordered on the ground that representation of a juvenile by an admittedly unprepared
attorney constituted lack of effective counsel.
184. See, e.g., In re Robert F., 30 A.D.2d 933, 293 N.Y.S.2d 873 (1968), where a new
hearing was ordered on the ground that the juvenile's counsel was neither notified of nor
present at the dispositional hearing.
185. See, e.g., In re Milton P., 45 A.D.2d 1010, 358 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1974), where the court
held counsel for the juvenile has a right to cross-examine witnesses, including
psychologists.
186. See, ag., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.281, .352 (Page 1976).
187. See text accompanying notes 103-04 & 126 supra.
188. Such persons include parents or guardians, representatives of social agencies, psy-
chologists, and probation officers.
189. See note 51 supra.
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nile's own interests are not the sole determinant in the disposition
of the case, as suggested, the presence of independent counsel for
the juvenile will not detract from the beneficial aspects of treating
juveniles specially. 9 ' Moreover, the use of independent legal rep-
resentation to provide the court with all relevant facts and inter-
ests, including the valid interests of the juvenile, will enable the
juvenile court to make truly fair and reasoned decisions regarding
the juvenile. To provide such representation would further the
aim of the original founders of the juvenile court system to create
a judicial forum particularly sensitive to the unique status of
juveniles before the court. 9 '
Despite the benefits to be derived from the use of independent
legal counsel in both noncriminal and quasi-criminal juvenile
proceedings, the Supreme Court may be reluctant to extend due
process rights, such as the juvenile's right to representation by sep-
arate legal counsel, beyond the rights narrowly granted in the
Gault, Winshio and Kent cases of the 1960's and early 1970's.192
Several recent Supreme Court decisions which focused on the in-
terrelationship of the parent, child and court suggest that there
will be no further extension of these rights. While these decisions
did not address directly the issue of providing legal counsel for
juveniles, the decisions were concerned with the related issue of
whether legislatures and courts may treat juveniles differently
from their adult counterparts. The decisions may be helpful,
therefore, in predicting how the Supreme Court will decide the
issue if presented with it in the future.
In Bellotti v. Baird,193 the Court held that a Massachusetts stat-
ute requiring an unmarried pregnant juvenile to obtain parental
consent before having an abortion was unconstitutional. 94 Four
Justices asserted, however, that abortion was an exceptional situa-
tion in which the state could intervene legitimately between parent
and child although the Court ordinarily would give deference to
parental child rearing. 95 Justice Powell noted that although
190. See notes 40-43 supra and accompanying text.
191. See notes 39-46 supra and accompanying text.
192. See notes 70-80 supra and accompanying text.
193. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
194. The statute was ruled unconstitutional because it permitted an abortion to be
withheld even in cases where the juvenile was mature and fully competent to make a deci-
sion and because it required parental consent even if obtaining such consent would not be
in the minor's best interest. Id at 644-51.
195. Id at 643. This concern was asserted by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stew-
art, Rehnquist, and Powell.
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juveniles have some rights, their status under the law is unique in
many respects. Powell continued:
the unique role in our society of the family ... requires that
constitutional principles be applied with sensitivity and flex-
ibility to the special needs of parents and children. We have
recognized three reasons justifying the conclusion that the con-
stitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of
adults: the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to
make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner, and the
importance of the parental role in child rearing. 96
In Parham v. JR ,"I the Court also recognized the special na-
ture of the parent-child relationship, holding that a formal hearing
was not required before a parent could commit his or her child to
a mental institution and that an informal post-commitment hear-
ing, as required by the Georgia statute, was sufficient.1 98 Writing
for the majority, Chief Justice Burger stated that the Court recog-
nized the presumption that parents act in the best interests of their
child,199 and that accordingly greater weight must be given to par-
ents' "traditional interests in and responsibility for the upbringing
of their child"2" than to arguments for extending the child's con-
stitutional rights.2°0 Only Justices Brennan, Marshall and Ste-
vens, in dissent, recognized that "[c]hildren incarcerated in public
mental institutions are . . . entitled to some champion who can
speak on their behalf and who stands ready to oppose wrongful
commitment."202
The majority opinions in these Supreme Court cases reempha-
size the traditional belief that parental primacy over the child is
essential for the protection of those individuals who are vulnera-
ble and incapable of independent thinking or decisionmaking.
Providing independent legal counsel for any juvenile before a ju-
196. Id at 634.
197. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
198. Id at 607.
199. Id at 610. Chief Justice Burger stated that to require a "formalized, factfinding
hearing" would jeopardize the parent-child bonds by "pitting the parents and child as ad-
versaries." Id
200. Id at 602.
201. Id
202. Id at 638 (dissenting opinion). Justice Brennan stated that the state
should not be permitted to deny that champion simply because the children's par-
ents or guardians wished them to be confined without a hearing. The risk of
erroneous commitment is simply too great unless there is some form of adversary
review. And fairness demands that children abandoned by their supposed protec-
tors to the rigors of institutional confinement be given the help of some separate
voice.
Id at 638-39 (dissenting opinion).
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venile court would appear to be antithetical to such a view since
independent counsel could assert interests inconsistent with, and
perhaps even superior to, the interests of the parents. Thus, if the
Supreme Court is presented with the question of whether juveniles
have a right to independent representation at a noncriminal pro-
ceeding, it is likely to rule that such representation is not ordered
by the Constitution.
V. CONCLUSION
Since the establishment of the juvenile court system in this
country, courts and legislatures have struggled to define the nature
of these special courts. Although this establishment was based on
a recognition that juvenile offenders must be treated more sympa-
thetically and benevolently by the court than their adult counter-
parts, the Supreme Court cases of the 1960's and early 1970's
narrowed the gap between juvenile and adult proceedings by pro-
viding juveniles with many of the due process rights guaranteed to
adults, including the rights to independent representation at
quasi-criminal proceedings. Since that time, state legislatures and
courts have extended this right to noncriminal proceedings. The
trend toward expansion of the juvenile's right to independent legal
representation, however, may be short lived. The Supreme Court
seems to have returned to a much more traditional view of the
juvenile, recognizing the superiority of parental rights and views
over the juvenile's rights and views. These cases indeed may sig-
nal the Court's unwillingness to extend further due process rights
to juveniles before the courts, including the right to independent
legal representation granted only narrowly in Gault.
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